The Relationship Between Iran’s Nuclear Program and Regime Protests Continues To Unravel
Demonstrators in Los Angeles march against the death of Mahsa Amini in solidarity with Iranian protests. Source for picture: Richard Vogel | AP News)
On the eve of December 31, 2022, the world prepared to celebrate the coming of a new year and its associated sense of hope and renewal. But, in Iran, many protesters – who have endured crackdowns and political suppression for almost half a year – held their breaths and vowed to stoically endure another year of demonstrations against Iran’s regime. These outraged protests were sparked in September, 2022 after Mahsa ‘Zhina’ Amini, a 22-year-old woman, died in the custody of Iran’s morality police after being arrested for improperly wearing a headscarf. As the protests grew in force – and as violent state repression followed – foreign governments quickly issued statements of warning and notices of stalled negotiations on the other elephant in the room: Iran's accelerating nuclear development.
Following the United State’s 2018 exit from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran Deal, Iran alarmed the international community by breaching the nuclear enrichment restraints set by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Previously, the JCPOA limited Iranian uranium enrichment to 3.67%, which was drastically below the 90% enrichment levels needed to develop military grade weapons. In early 2021, Iran defied IAEA regulations by enriching their nuclear material at a 20% threshold, equivalent to the limit for the production of isotopes for medical and scientific purposes. Recently, Iran breached 60% enrichment levels and accelerated centrifuge development, leading the IAEA to warn that Iran could create an atomic bomb in three to four weeks. The Biden Administration, alarmed by these developments, engaged in diplomacy with Iran over a re-negotiated JCPOA. But the eruption of the largest protests in Iran since the 1979 establishment of the Islamic Republic has drastically changed American and western calculus towards the JCPOA. Faced with the simultaneous intertwining of protests and Iran's developing nuclear program, it is imperative to consider how these two trends will impact and leave reverberations for each other in 2023.
The immediate impacts of Iran’s brutal crackdown included sanctions and asset freezes against officials or politicians behind the repression, leading to standstill in JCPOA negotiations. The United Kingdom, a signatory of the JCPOA, has imposed multiple rounds of sanctions on Iranian officials heavily involved in cracking down on protests and threatened to levy further sanctions when Iran's “actions” become unacceptable. U.S. Special Envoy to Iran Robert Malley stated that negotiations have stalled due to “this popular movement and the brutal crackdown of the regime against protestors.” Special Envoy Malley also listed the sale of drones from Iran to Russia and Iran’s detainment of three American hostages as additional reasons for stalled diplomacy.
Moreover, a re-negotiation of the Iran Deal would include repealing sanctions on certain Iranian officials – a policy at odds with the current human rights priorities of the United States. Kelsey Davenport, the director of nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, explains that “a restored JCPOA would allow the Iranian government to access frozen assets and benefit from sanctions relief.” Even if President Biden restored the JCPOA, which is an increasingly unlikely scenario given Iran's sociopolitical climate, Congress would still need to approve sanctions relief. Davenport further explains that “Like the administration, Congress is focused on steps that the United States can take to support the Iranian protests. Even some previous JCPOA supporters are urging a pause in negotiations with Iran during the protests.” With reports of mass arrests, lethal force, and public executions, it is inescapably apparent that Congress would be appalled by the suppression and violence faced by the Iranian people.
Following these position reversals from the West, Iran painted protests as a Western-fueled concept in an attempt to reduce the domestic appeal of the locally-grown movement. Iran specifically called out media coverage from the U.S., the United Kingdom, and Norway as a perpetrating force of the “rioters” with an intent to destabilize Iran. Such statements attempt to engender a “rally around the flag” effect or a short term surge of nationalism when a state is under adversarial threat. Given the months-long continuance of the protests, Iran’s government has been unsuccessful in producing such a response. Iran’s aggravated reactions towards Western coverage do not necessarily signal that the autocracy is hostile towards a new JCPOA, evidenced by Iran’s recently beseeching argument to the Europe Union that a re-negotiated Iran Deal would enable the EU to “not freeze” this winter. Rather, the rally-around-the-flag intentions depicts a government attempting to maintain domestic survival by introducing foreign actors as a red herring – even if these pretenses criticize the very actors on the other side of the JCPOA negotiation table.
The protests may even push Iran to act erratically and escalate nuclear development or regional belligerence. An early November Saudi intelligence assessment reported that Iran was preparing for a military attack in the Middle East in an effort to detract attention from the protests and their demands for regime change. The threat passed as the following months witnessed no out-of-the-norm attack; nonetheless, the assessment depicts an Iranian government willing to commit violence to divert attention from calls for democracy. If the regime perceives itself as under such an existential threat, it is not unreasonable to assume that Iran would risk a complete breakdown in JCPOA negotiations – and its international diplomatic fallout – in exchange for survival. Yet, when taking a step back to analyze the larger picture, Saudi Arabian intelligence agencies may have published the report to stoke tension in the Middle East, fuel political tension between Iran and the United States, and diminish chances of a re-negotiated JCPOA – a policy that Saudi Arabia has long been opposed to.
Yet, when addressing long-term impacts, the government repression against protests may become a double-edged sword and impede nuclear development. The current demonstrations have imposed economic costs upon the regime, potentially decreasing the financial resources that Iran can commit to its nuclear program. Country-wide internet blackouts, imposed to prevent protester organization and communication, have cost the country $24 billion. Already, more than 700,000 companies that rely on Instagram and social media for sales have faced closures due to the digital restrictions. A former week-long internet blackout in November, 2019 cost the Iranian economy $3 billion in failed internet payments. Meanwhile, a 2013 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace study estimated that Iran required approximately $100 billion to build, research, and operate a nuclear power plant. The study researchers later modified the estimated cost to $500 billion in 2015. Within this picture, $3 billion may appear as a drop in the ocean. But, after considering the widespread and months-long persistence of the protests, the internet blackouts may leave palpable impediments on Iranian nuclear aggression.
As the international community settles into 2023, the intertwinement of Iran's national security and domestic socio-political spheres will continue to leave marks on each other, impacting a critical international hotspot. As already seen from above, each trend does not exist in a vacuum, but leaves magnifying or impeding reverberations. At the moment, policymakers in the West remain committed to spotlighting the human rights abuses perpetrated by Iran against its citizens. However, some political analysts have argued that this freeze in negotiations risks the long-term security of the Middle East and international community. How policymakers and diplomats will weigh these two developments remains to be seen.