North Korea: The Irreversible Nuclear State
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Donald Trump at the 2018 Singapore Summit held to discuss potential nuclear disarmament marking a key step toward diplomacy among the two nations. Source: Saul Loeb / AFP
On April 9, the North Korea state media reaffirmed that its status as a nuclear weapons state is “irreversible” and not open for negotiation regardless of how forcefully the United States or its allies push for disarmament. However, this message is likely more than a mere reiteration. The timing and emphasis of this statement carries serious implications considering the evolving geopolitical climate of Northeast Asia. Today, the region is marked by increasingly overt militarization, deteriorating formal diplomacy, and growing strategic cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—an alliance also known as the CRINKs—to challenge Western hegemony.
Perhaps a key element of Pyongyang’s statement lies in its finality. Since 2022, North Korea has codified its nuclear weapons policy into law, declaring preemptive nuclear strikes as a fair and permissible defense mechanism, and barring any talks of denuclearization altogether. This shift came after nearly two decades of North Korea using the development or threat of nuclear weapons as a means to extract concessions like food aid, sanctions relief, or diplomatic recognition. North Korea’s escalation, therefore, reflects a strategic transformation in its military and diplomatic strategy: to them, nuclear weapons are no longer a bargaining chip for sanctions relief or diplomatic normalization, but a core element of the regime’s identity and survival that is essential to resisting perceived Western imperialism.
North Korea’s transition from its self-instated sovereign right of existential deterrence to operational nuclear posture, which refers to the specific readiness, deployment, and command structure of a nation’s nuclear weapons, also indicates the potential for its use in regional warfighting. This is especially concerning for Western powers given that North Korea is rapidly growing its nuclear arsenal, which reportedly also includes tactical nuclear warheads and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching mainland United States. Such assertive escalations further cement the regime’s position as an irreversible nuclear state, and might even raise the risk of damaging miscalculations in moments of crisis.
North Korea’s April 9 statement also raises concerns for the United States and its allies—not because it signals an immediate threat, but because it reflects a broader erosion of diplomatic pathways and an increasingly normalized nuclear North Korea. The country’s leadership is not only entrenching its identity on the global stage as a nuclear regime, but also pairing it with aggressive posturing through risky missile tests near Japan, simulated nuclear strikes in South Korea, and growing joint exercises with Russia.
But perhaps this strategic hardening by North Korea is a result of the United States’ diplomatic efforts over the past two administrations. Under President Trump’s first administration, for example, U.S.-North Korea relations saw a dramatic shift in tone, punctuated especially by the 2018 Singapore and 2019 Hanoi summits. These historic firsts symbolized a break from decades of silence from either end and aimed to move toward diplomatic negotiations. However, these meetings produced no substantive arguments on denuclearization and sanctions relief. During the Hanoi Summit, North Korea advocated for a lift in the sanctions imposed on the regime in exchange for partial dismantlement of its nuclear program, creating a diplomatic gridlock over irreconcilable demands and a collapse in any further attempts of negotiations. By the end of Trump’s first term, communication between the two nations ended abruptly, and both nations returned to the status quo—which meant Pyongyang’s return to missile testing.
The Biden administration inherited this breakdown, and chose to adopt a more traditional strategy by offering calibrated diplomacy with no preconditions while emphasizing deterrence through strengthened alliances with South Korea and Japan. North Korea, however, dismissed these attempts and steadily continued to advance its arsenal, finally codifying its nuclear status into domestic law in 2022, signaling an explicit rejection of any denuclearization talks.
After returning to office at the start of this year, Trump has frequently alluded to his good relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. While there may have initially been a possibility to reopen negotiation and diplomacy, North Korea’s firm stance on its irreversibility as a nuclear nation seems to indicate otherwise. To complicate matters even further, Trump recently described North Korea as a “nuclear power,” raising severe concerns that the U.S. may be in the works of officially recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. The consequences of this rhetoric can be rather far-reaching.
Should the U.S. officially recognize North Korea as a nuclear power during Trump’s second term, it would signal a dramatic departure from decades of bipartisan nonproliferation policy and could set a dangerous precedent for other states with nuclear ambitions. This also paves the path for the erosion of the global nonproliferation regime, especially through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and signal to adversaries that defiance and persistence can override international norms.
Though not yet formalized, the possibility of official recognition from the United States could also destabilize Northeast Asia by prompting U.S. allies like South Korea or Japan—who still value denuclearization of North Korea—to consider their own nuclear options to defend themselves from their totalitarian neighbor, risking a potential regional arms race. While Trump’s rhetoric may seem like an acknowledgement of reality, it is likely to come at the cost of long-term stability and international norms.
What makes North Korea’s shift and adamance about its nuclear irreversibility especially concerning is the risk that the world is starting to accept North Korea’s permanent nuclear status. With no reported ongoing negotiations, a growing alignment with other authoritarian states like China, Russia, and Iran that provide diplomatic cover and economic cooperation, and an international landscape consumed by Ukraine and the Middle East, Pyongyang’s calculus is clear: the world is distracted and its nuclear program has crossed a point of no return. In this environment, the nation sees little incentive to negotiate and every reason to cement North Korea’s nuclear identity, especially among signs that even its longest and fiercest critics might be beginning to accept its nuclear arsenal.
While the April 8th statement may echo past declarations, it is more than a reiteration—it represents a shift securing North Korea’s nuclearization not as an anomaly but as a normalized actor in the global nuclear order. If the United States and its allies fail to recalibrate their approach and continue to overtly acknowledge North Korea’s nuclear status, deterrence may remain stable, but it may do so at the expense of any long-term goals of achieving global denuclearization.